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Abstract 
We document and study international differences in both ownership and holdings of 
stocks, private businesses, homes, and mortgages among households aged fifty or more in 
thirteen countries, using new and comparable survey data. We employ counterfactual 
techniques to decompose observed differences across the Atlantic, within the US, and 
within Europe into those arising from differences in population characteristics and 
differences in economic environments. We then correlate the latter differences to 
country-level indicators. Ownership across the range of the assets considered tends to be 
more widespread among US households. We document that shortly prior to the current 
crisis, US households tended to invest larger amounts in stocks and smaller ones in 
homes, and to have larger mortgages in older age, even controlling for characteristics. 
This is consistent with the high prevalence of negative equity associated with the current 
crisis. More generally, we find that differences in household characteristics often play a 
small role, while differences in economic environments tend to explain most of the 
observed differences in ownership rates and in amounts held. The latter differences are 
much more pronounced among European countries than among US regions, suggesting 
further potential for harmonization of policies and institutions.  
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1.  Introduction 
One of the main objectives of a ‘single market’ as implemented among European 
Union countries or US states is  to ensure that participants or potential entrants in markets 
for goods and services, labor, assets, and debts face similar market conditions or 
economic environment, regardless of the country (or region) in which they are located. 
Such similarity, for which the metaphor of a ‘global’ or European ‘village’ is sometimes 
used, can be facilitated by progressive harmonization of policies and institutional 
frameworks within which economic agents in different countries operate, and by 
improved access to markets located in other countries (or regions) within a union. 
Furthermore, comparable economic environments could lead to similar market outcomes, 
at least among mature market participants sharing common characteristics. Yet, 
international comparisons of such market outcomes are often either impossible because of 
lack of comparable detailed data or complicated because they refer to populations with 
different configuration of characteristics.  
One of the important market outcomes potentially affected by differences in 
economic environments is the size and composition of household portfolios, the study of 
which has been attracting increased attention in recent years.
1 Reasons for such attention 
include the increasing complexity of these portfolios, the bigger role played by defined-
contribution saving vehicles in financing retirement, the implications of population aging 
for aggregate asset investment, and the rapid pace of financial innovation.  
In this paper we add to the literature on household finance by documenting and 
analyzing international differences in asset and debt market participation and levels of 
holdings among mature market participants in the US and in twelve European countries 2 
 
in 2004-5. We focus our attention on stock holdings (direct plus indirect in the form of 
mutual funds and retirement accounts), private business ownership, and ownership of 
primary residence, as well as on mortgages associated with this residence. Our aim is to 
examine the extent to which older households that have a similar configuration of 
characteristics and live in different countries differ with respect to ownership and held 
amounts of the aforementioned assets and mortgages.  
The paper has three novel features. First, it uncovers previously unknown patterns 
of cross-country and interregional differences in household portfolios using a set of three 
internationally comparable micro-surveys. The surveys are: i) for the US, the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS); ii) for England, the English Longitudinal Study of Aging 
(ELSA); iii) for eleven additional European countries the Survey of Health, Aging and 
Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Data from these surveys share a common questionnaire 
design that facilitates the direct cross-country comparison of asset holdings and of the 
influence of given household characteristics on investment decisions. All three surveys 
cover those aged fifty or more, i.e., mature market participants who control a large share 
of society’s wealth and face the challenges of retirement financing. 
Second, the paper introduces to the field of household finance methods of 
counterfactual analysis for the purpose of decomposing observed international differences 
in asset market outcomes into those arising from differences in household characteristics 
and in the economic environment faced by households of similar characteristics. These 
methods are already being used in the labor literature to study discrimination or 
international differences in the relationship between worker characteristics and wages.
2 
The common thread that runs across these different strands of economic literature has to 3 
 
do with differences in market conditions faced by agents of given remaining 
characteristics: men versus women, minorities versus the rest, workers or households in 
one country or region versus another.  
We perform a counterfactual analysis based on quantile regressions that allow us to 
study differences across the entire distribution of wealth holdings, as opposed to just the 
mean or median.
3 We first compare the US against European countries, then different 
regions within the US, and finally countries within Europe. The within-US comparison 
will allow us to develop a yardstick by which to assess differences across the Atlantic and 
within Europe. 
We document considerable differences in observed asset market participation rates 
and levels of participants’ holdings, across Europe and the US but also within Europe. 
These differences arise predominantly from divergent economic environments that 
households of similar characteristics face. Finally, we link these estimated effects of 
differences in economic environments faced by households with the same configuration 
of characteristics to a set of commonly used indicators of the institutional and policy 
environment in the countries under consideration. 
Our results suggest that US households of given characteristics tend to have greater 
participation probabilities than their European counterparts, often across the range of the 
assets considered. Furthermore, European asset owners tend to invest smaller (adjusted 
for PPP) amounts in stocks and larger amounts in real assets (private businesses and 
primary residence) than US households at comparable positions of the distribution of 
holdings, even after controlling for differences in the configuration of characteristics in 
the asset holder pools. We also find that US households face larger outstanding 4 
 
mortgages in older age compared to European households of similar characteristics. As a 
result they were more vulnerable to the risk of negative housing equity shortly prior to the 
recent financial crisis. 
In most cases, international differences in the configuration of characteristics play a 
small or no role at all in generating observed international differences in asset market 
behavior. Sometimes, however, estimated differences in market conditions are so 
pronounced that they would result in even larger actual disparities if it were not for the 
partly mitigating effect of differences in household characteristics.  
In Section 2 we describe the data. In Section 3, we study differences in participation 
rates in the three assets and in mortgages. In Section 4, we focus on asset owners and 
decompose observed international differences in amounts of holdings at various 
percentiles of the distribution of such holdings. We also link results to existing indicators 
of the state of relevant asset markets and of government policy throughout. Section 5 
offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.  The Data 
We use the three most comprehensive data sets on portfolios of households aged 50 
and above currently available. These surveys share a common questionnaire design. The 
HRS surveys US older households every two years since 1992, while the ELSA surveys 
older households in England starting in 2002 and continuing with a second wave in 2004. 
Finally, the SHARE, modeled after the HRS and ELSA, collected its first wave of data in 
2004 in Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Austria, 
Italy, Spain, and Greece, and in 2005 in Belgium.
4 We use the 2004-5 wave for all 5 
 
countries and information on assets and household characteristics derived from a 
harmonized set of questions. 
Table 1 reports participation rates and levels, by quartile of holdings, for three main 
asset types (stocks, private business, and principal residence); as well as levels of 
outstanding mortgage debts and net worth, all in PPP-adjusted thousands of 2004 
dollars.
5 Taking Europe as a whole, net worth is somewhat lower than in the US at the 
median, and considerably so at the 75
th quantile. There is considerable variation of net 
worth within Europe, and country rankings change as we move along the distribution. 
The lowest median net worth is observed in Sweden and the largest in England. For the 
25
th quantile, Austria and Belgium provide the two extremes. England comes top for the 
75
th quantile, followed by Switzerland, while Greece ranks at the bottom.  
Ownership of stocks, either direct or indirect through mutual funds and retirement 
accounts, is greatest in Sweden, Denmark, and in the US. It is smallest in Austria, Italy, 
Spain, and Greece. Homeownership is highest in Spain and Greece and lowest in 
Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria. The highest rates of business ownership 
are observed in Sweden and Switzerland, with the US and Denmark a short distance 
behind them. The lowest rates are observed in Austria and England. Notably, there is 
immense variation in the prevalence of outstanding mortgages across Europe. Although 
the average prevalence in Europe is less than half of that in the US, in certain European 
countries (Switzerland, Denmark, Netherlands, and Sweden) mortgage debts are more 
widespread than in the US, and even more so than in southern European countries. 
Ownership rates of all four items differ also by US region, but the range of variation is 
substantially smaller. 6 
 
Turning to the size of asset holdings, we find a stark contrast between real and 
financial assets. The US dominates every European country in stockholding, and is 
dominated by the vast majority of European countries in the case of the primary 
residence. As for mortgages outstanding in older age, we encounter in the US higher 
amounts than in every European country, except Switzerland. US regions also exhibit 
some heterogeneity in asset and mortgage holdings, but over a much smaller range than 
that prevailing in European countries.  
 
3.  Sources of International Differences in Asset Market Participation 
3.1  Estimation Model and Methodology 
In this section, we decompose differences in observed participation rates into those 
resulting from different configuration of characteristics in the population and those 
resulting from international differences in the influence of a given set of characteristics. 
We will refer to the former as ‘covariate effects’ and to the latter as ‘coefficient effects’. 
This decomposition is based on a set of probit regressions, where participation in a given 
asset is regressed on a number of household characteristics.  
We use as regressors a broad set of socio-economic characteristics that existing 
theory and empirical studies suggest as relevant for household asset and debt choices. As 
these covariates are based on questions harmonized across the three surveys, a high 
degree of international comparability is achieved. Definitions of variables are included in 
the Data Appendix, while Table 2 provides summary statistics of covariates across all 
countries in the sample.  7 
 
In particular, we allow for age effects through a 2
nd order age polynomial, and for 
household size, which is likely to determine consumption needs and affect the amount 
available for saving out of any given amount of resources. Furthermore, we control for 
the level of education (finished high school/having at least some post secondary 
education), which tends to influence not only future employment and earnings prospects 
but also the ability of the household to collect and process information relevant for asset 
and debt market participation; work status (retired/working/unemployed-other inactive),
6 
which could affect the background income risk to which the household is exposed,  which 
in turn can influence  the ownership of different assets or debts; and for marital status 
(couple/widow/never married), which can determine spending decisions, the 
responsibilities of the household member in charge of finances, and potential constraints 
on that member’s behavior in asset and debt markets.  
We include health conditions, because they can affect household asset choices.
7 
Physical health can influence the ability and inclination of the household to make the 
effort required for investing in asset markets, as well as the amount of background risk 
the household faces due to out-of-pocket health expenditures. We use self-reported bad 
health (includes responses ‘fair’ and ‘poor’ in HRS), and, as an objective health indicator, 
the number of activities of daily living (ADLs) with which the household has problems.  
We also control for recall ability, as a measure of cognitive skills relevant to 
processing information needed for participation in asset and debt markets.
8 Moreover, we 
condition on the subjective probability to leave a bequest, in order to account for bequest 
motives influencing asset ownership; on whether the household provides help to 
relatives/neighbors, and on whether it engages in volunteering, as indicators of social 8 
 
interactions and of concern for others.
9 Finally, we include income and net wealth 
quartiles (where wealth excludes the asset in question), in order to capture the relevance 
of household economic resources for asset and debt demand. Controlling for resources is 
dictated both by modern portfolio theory, with its emphasis on “cash on hand” as a key 
state variable for portfolio formation, and by the need to avoid confounding the role of 
other determinants with that of wealth when the latter is not adequately accounted for. 
We first run one probit for each asset in the country used as the ‘base’. Table A.13 
in the Web Appendix presents a representative set of coefficient estimates. Marginal 
effects of two included characteristics on the probability of asset and mortgage debt 
ownership and a comparison of those across countries and instruments are presented in 
Figures A.9 and A.10 in the Web Appendix.  We then construct the counterfactual, 
base i p
, ˆ
, namely the average predicted probability of participation that households in country i 
would exhibit if they faced the coefficients that were estimated for the base country. The 
difference in participation rates between the base and country i is then decomposed into 
two components: 
{ } { }
i base i base i base i base pr p p pr pr pr − + − = −
, , ˆ ˆ         (1) 
The first is due to the difference in participation rates that would have been observed if 
residents of the base country had the same configuration of characteristics as in country i, 
i.e., it represents the contribution of household characteristics (‘covariate effects’). The 
second is due to the difference in participation that would have prevailed if residents of 
country i had faced the same coefficients as those in the base country: it reflects the 
contribution of differences in coefficients (‘coefficient effects’). The decomposition 
yields point estimates of the two effects. We compute bootstrap standard errors by 9 
 
drawing (with replacement) from the full sample for both countries and repeating this 
estimation and decomposition two hundred times. 
The more similar the prevailing market conditions in a set of countries or regions 
(which include the institutional and policy environment), the more similar should be the 
participation probabilities for households with a given configuration of characteristics 
and attitudes.  Coefficient effects would speak directly to this question. Covariate effects 
show the extent to which differences in participation probabilities are due to a relatively 
unfavorable configuration of the characteristics of the population in a particular country 
or region. We first use the US as ‘base’ and compare to it European countries. In order to 
set a realistic benchmark, we then consider coefficient and covariate effects among US 
regions (using the Midwest as the base region), which share a common federal 
government but also allow state discretion, especially on fiscal matters. Finally, we do the 
same analysis within Europe, using Germany as the base. 
While precise attribution of coefficient effects to specific features of the market 
environment in each country is beyond the scope of our paper, we find that the pattern 
implied by our estimates is consistent with the pattern of various widely-used indicators 
of institutional and policy features. This in turn implies that harmonized institutions and 
policies can lead to greater similarity in the link between household characteristics and 
asset market behavior.  
 
3.2  US-Europe Comparisons 
Table 3a shows differences in participation rates in three assets and in mortgage 
debt between the US and twelve European countries, and their decomposition into 10 
 
coefficient and covariate effects relating to the economic environment and to population 
characteristics, respectively. Observed differences in participation rates vary across 
financial instruments and countries, not only in magnitude but also in sign. In the face of 
this rich variation in observed differences, population effects are remarkably 
unidirectional. With only one exception, US households have characteristics that make 
them more, or at least no less, likely to participate in any of the three assets and to own 
mortgages on the primary residence. It is differences in the economic environment that 
are key to generating the rich pattern of sign variation in observed participation 
differences. 
Only Sweden and Denmark exhibit higher stockholding participation rates than the 
US, and these arise because households of given characteristics are more likely to 
participate in the stock market if they live in these two countries. So strong is the effect of 
the environment that it prevails on the opposite influence of population characteristics. In 
France, the effect of the economic environment is also positive, but not sufficient to 
overcome the covariate effects, yielding overall lower participation than in the US. The 
special position of Sweden, Denmark and France seems to be related in part to the state of 
pension systems. In Sweden and Denmark, retirement accounts are mandatory.
10 
Moreover, these are three of the five European countries in our sample where defined 
contribution, occupational pension plans were already available in 2004, possibly 
creating spillovers to forms of stockholding included in our data.
11  
Table 4 presents a set of aggregate indicators relevant to stockholding that are also 
informative about the economic environment prevailing in each country (additional 
indicators are provided in the Web Appendix). According to these, the US has the lowest 11 
 
transactions costs in the stock market, the greatest spending on information and 
communication technology as a percentage of GDP, and the highest stockholder 
protection. All three factors have been shown in existing literature on stockholding to 
encourage participation. In addition, the extremely high internet penetration in Sweden 
and the US may have fostered stockholding by lowering information and transaction 
costs.
12  
We next associate estimated differences in the economic environment to a set of 
aggregate indicators that reflect certain economic conditions prevailing in each country. 
Table 5, panel A, presents estimates of a regression of estimated coefficient effects for 
stock ownership on the following indicators: market capitalization to GDP ratio, the 
number of Internet connections, a measure of shareholder rights, and an aggregate index 
of prevailing trust.  
With respect to shareholder protection, a frequently used measure is the 
Antidirector Rights Index (ADRI) introduced by Laporta et al. (1997). Giannetti and 
Koskinen (2003), using aggregate data from 26 countries, found a positive association 
between ADRI and stock market participation rates. We employ a revised version of 
ADRI for 2005 that was recently proposed by Spamann (2009). Our trust measure is a 
world index of trust constructed from questions in the World Values Survey, which 
provides internationally comparable data on household values and norms. Guiso et al. 
(2008) show that the level of trust prevailing in each country is positively associated with 
the fraction of  stock market participants in the population.     
Results from robust regressions of our estimated coefficient effects on these 
aggregate indicators suggest that, controlling for other factors, stronger shareholder rights 12 
 
and higher prevailing trust in European countries are associated with smaller differences 
with respect to the US that are attributable to the economic environment.  
Turning to ownership of (at least a share in a) private business, we observe that only 
Sweden and Switzerland rank above the US. Based on the results of our decompositions 
shown in Table 3a, however, it is Sweden and Denmark that exhibit significantly higher 
participation rates for households of a given configuration of characteristics compared to 
the US. In Switzerland, estimated coefficient effects are negative but statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, five European countries exhibit conditions in their 
economic environment that do not favor participation in private business of similar 
households compared to the US. This is a richer pattern of variation in effects of the 
economic environment than for stockholding.  
We have examined a number of supply-side indicators that are related to 
entrepreneurial activity (some of them are shown in Table 4, while the full set is 
presented in the Web Appendix), to see if they are consistent with the pattern of 
estimated coefficient effects. The World Bank ‘Ease of Doing Business’ overall index 
points to the US as the country where it is easiest to do business, whereas rankings for the 
various components of the index do not always place the US at the top. Our estimates 
suggest that the overall summary index, though useful, may be masking the true 
underlying variation in market conditions by netting out relevant conflicting differences. 
Upon close inspection, the index takes a rather simple approach to aggregating rankings 
across different criteria, namely a straight averaging of rankings, without considering 
distances and differences in the relative importance of each criterion. For example, 
Sweden ranks above the US in dealing with licenses, registering property, trading across 13 
 
borders, and enforcing contracts. The specific averaging and netting out process puts the 
US on top, but our estimates imply that certain underlying factors, possibly captured by 
individual components of the index, dominate and make older Swedish households more 
likely to participate in private business than their US counterparts. 
We also run robust regressions to correlate estimated coefficient effects with some 
aggregate indices denoting a European country’s rank in: i) tax burden; ii) difficulty in 
getting credit, and iii) difficulty in trading across borders. Results are presented in panel 
B of Table 5. We find that our estimated differences in economic environment with 
respect to the US are systematically (positively) related to the tax burden and to the extent 
of difficulties in getting credit in Europe.  
Turning to homeownership, we find that Belgium, Spain, and Greece exhibit higher 
homeownership rates among older households than the US. While US older population 
characteristics would result in higher (or at any rate not lower) homeownership rates than 
in any European country, all three southern European countries, Belgium, and England 
exhibit higher ownership rates of the primary residence once we compare households 
with the same configuration of characteristics.  
We also associate estimated coefficient effects with two indicators of costs that 
prospective homebuyers face in each country: a (harmonized) housing price index, and 
VAT on new homes. Results (presented in panel C of Table 5) suggest that the VAT on 
home purchases across countries is systematically related to these coefficient effects, and 
that a higher VAT in Europe would have a statistically significant effect on making 
economic conditions less conducive for home ownership compared to the US.  14 
 
The next panel of Table 3a presents a similar decomposition for mortgages, to see if 
the pattern we discovered for homeownership is mirrored in the pattern of mortgage 
participation in older age. Comparing first the observed raw differences in participation, 
we find that in all European countries where homeownership is higher than in the US, 
mortgages are less prevalent. In fact, only in Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland is mortgage ownership more frequent than in the US.  
Secondly, we compare coefficient effects for homeownership and for mortgages. Is 
it the case that countries with more a favorable economic environment for 
homeownership are also shown to have more favorable environment for mortgages 
outstanding, at least as far as older households are concerned? It turns out that in all cases 
of European countries exhibiting favorable conditions for homeownership relative to the 
US, the tendency of given older households to have mortgages outstanding is lower than 
in the US, not higher. In fact, nine of the twelve country pairs exhibit a reversal of signs 
between the coefficient effects for homeownership and for mortgages. Countries in which 
older households of given characteristics are more likely to own their home than in the 
US are also those in which such households are more likely to have paid off their 
mortgage (if they ever got one) by the time they are included in the sample.  
Note that we are controlling for non-housing wealth, so being generally wealthier is 
not the mechanism generating more limited dependence on mortgages in older age. The 
shorter duration of mortgages, the greater down-payment ratios, and the smaller 
frequency of ever having had a mortgage could all contribute to a lower probability of 
still owing in older age in Europe.  15 
 
While it is instructive to look at each asset or debt separately, they form together a 
single portfolio. There is room for substitution across assets (an issue that we will take up 
when we look at amounts), as involvement in one market could potentially influence the 
chances of participating in another. A particularly interesting question is whether 
homeowners differ from non-homeowners in stockholding participation and its associated 
coefficient effects. To probe into this issue, we have divided stockholders into 
homeowners and non-homeowners (results from these decompositions are shown in 
Table A.7 of the Web Appendix). We find that differences in stockholding participation 
rates across the Atlantic are typically much larger (and sometimes of different sign) for 
homeowners than for non-homeowners. Strikingly, in all countries, homeowners exhibit 
larger differences in stockholding participation for given characteristics (i.e. larger 
coefficient effects) than non-homeowners.  
This finding is consistent with the view that owning a home discourages households 
from owning stocks. Homeowners in Europe, who are exposed to the conditions in 
housing and possibly mortgage markets of their countries, apparently find it more 
difficult to participate in the stock market as well. Indeed, market spillovers are quite 
consistent with the approach taken in this paper, namely to focus on disparities in the 
economic environment at large, after removing any influence due to differences in 
characteristics, rather than exclusively on conditions in a specific market.
13 
 
3.3  Similarity of Economic Conditions within the US and within Europe 
In this section, we extend the analysis of the previous section to examine 
differences within Europe (with Germany as the benchmark); and across four US regions, 16 
 
Midwest (MW, used as the base region), Northeast (NE), South (S), and West (W). We 
do so for two main reasons. First, coefficient effects across the Atlantic look sizeable, but 
it is useful to put them into perspective by comparing them to an actual case of a more 
homogeneous economic environment prevailing in a federal country, such as the US. 
Clearly, zero coefficient effects represent an extreme theoretical benchmark unlikely to 
be achieved even in such a case. Second, while the US enjoys mobility of labor and 
capital across geographical regions, a common monetary policy and stock market, and 
common federal institutions, it also exhibits variation across its States, e.g. with respect to 
fiscal matters. It is thus worthwhile to see if our method is sensitive enough to pick up 
significant differences in market conditions arising from such considerations, and how 
large these effects are compared to those across the Atlantic and across European 
countries that are part of the European Union (with the exception of Switzerland). 
Table 3b shows decompositions of differences in average participation probabilities 
for each asset and for mortgages within the US. Households in the MW exhibit higher 
participation rates across the board, with two exceptions: in the NE stockownership is 
more frequent, and the same is true for mortgages in the West. The bottom panel shows 
corresponding differences between Germany and each of the European countries in our 
sample. We see that observed differences in participation within the US are on a much 
smaller scale compared to inta-European differences, except for the case of business 
ownership. 
Our method is sensitive enough to pick up statistically significant differences in 
market conditions across US regions for some region/financial instrument combinations. 
Market conditions in the MW are typically estimated to be more conducive to 17 
 
participation in any of these instruments, with two exceptions: stockownership, where the 
NE dominates; and homeownership, for which the South offers more favorable 
conditions. However, these intra-US differences pale in comparison to the estimated 
intra-European differences in the tendency of similar households to own stocks or their 
primary residence, and to have mortgages outstanding in older age.  
The results shown in Table 3b suggest that these sizeable differences in 
participation rates within Europe are typically not due to statistically significant effects of 
population characteristics in different European countries relative to Germany. They are 
rather due to strong coefficient effects, i.e., to differences in the economic environment. 
Germany (the base country) is approximately in the middle of the ranking regarding 
stockholding participation rates. Interestingly, the sign pattern of observed differences in 
participation is fully reflected in the sign pattern of coefficient effects, with most 
covariate effects statistically insignificant. The position of Germany in the ranking seems 
to be reflecting the tendency of given households to participate, rather than a poor 
composition of the population in terms of characteristics conducive to stockholding. 
Germany has the lowest homeownership rate among European countries, as 
indicated by the negative observed differences in participation rates shown in Table 3b. It 
is interesting that this negative sign is mirrored in statistically significant negative effects 
of the economic environment (with the exception of Switzerland), while the pattern of 
covariate effects is much more mixed and largely insignificant. On the side of mortgages, 
it is noteworthy that Germany is not the country with uniformly best or worst economic 
environment: negative coefficient effects on ownership of primary residence are 
accompanied by coefficient effects for mortgages of mixed sign. This lack of symmetry 18 
 
makes clear that the low homeownership rate in Germany does not simply reflect 
conditions that make it difficult to have an outstanding mortgage in older age.  
It seems likely that part of the differences in homeownership rates for households of 
given characteristics has to do with cultural factors, such as the societal importance of  
homeownership, that we cannot fully control for by making use of the variables at our 
disposal. Another part could be due to differential transactions costs, tax treatments, and 
credit market conditions across Europe. This is indeed suggested by the high cost of 
housing transactions in Germany and the inability of owners-occupiers therein to deduct 
mortgage interest, unlike what happens with owners who rent to others. When there is 
substantial interaction between culture, institutions, and policies, progress towards 
harmonization of the economic environment is likely to be slower and more cumbersome.  
Our findings for private business ownership suggest greater similarity of market 
conditions in Europe than for the other assets. Coefficient effects are insignificant for 
about half the country pairs. However, comparison between coefficient and covariate 
effects for business ownership among older households suggests that the economic 
environment once again plays a dominant role in determining the sign and overall size of 
differences in participation rates within Europe.   
All in all, we find that intra-European differences are quantitatively significantly 
larger than intra-US ones for stockholding, home ownership, and mortgages outstanding 
in older age, though often not for private business ownership. The role of population 
differences in shaping the overall observed differences in participation rates within the 
US and within Europe appears much more limited, in terms of statistical significance, 
sign, and size. 19 
 
 
4.  Sources of International Differences in Levels of Asset Holdings  
We turn now to real, PPP-adjusted levels of asset holdings across the thirteen 
countries, document their differences, and perform an equivalent decomposition into the 
part that arises from differences in economic environment and in characteristics of the 
pool of holders of the four financial instruments. We employ decomposition techniques 
based on quantile regressions in order to study the entire distribution of holdings across 
the owner pool in each country. A key advantage of this decomposition is that it allows 
us to examine whether market conditions facing relatively small holders show greater 
similarity across countries compared to conditions facing large holders.  
 
4.1  Estimation Model and Methodology 
We employ a variant of the Machado and Mata (2005) quantile-regression 
decomposition.
14 We first estimate ninety nine vectors j  of quantile regression 
coefficients at each single percentile, j θ , of the distribution of the instrument in the base 
country: 
[ ] ( ) j
base base base base base
j b X X y Q θ θ = |      (2) 
We control for the same set of regressors as in the participation probit described in 
Section 3.1. Table A.14 in the Web Appendix presents sets of median regression 
estimates, by financial instrument, for the three reference countries or regions: the US, 
used for US-Europe comparisons; the Midwest (MW), used for within-US comparisons; 
and Germany, used for comparisons across Europe. 20 
 
We then make m random draws, with replacement, of characteristics and 
corresponding weights from the European country i, where m is the number of owners of 
the instrument in question in the sample from country i. This process is repeated ninety 
nine times. Each outcome of these draws, containing m observations, is denoted by 
i
j X . 
We generate ninety nine counterfactual samples of size m from the desired conditional 
distribution:  ( ) j
base i
j j b X y θ =
* . We use these values to generate the unconditional 
counterfactual distribution:  ( )
base ib X y f ;
* . Finally, for each of the three sequences of 
variables (log holdings in the ‘base’, in country i, and counterfactual values), we calculate 
percentiles using population weights.  
The decomposition can be written as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) { }
i Base i Base i Base i Base y f b X y f b X y f y f y f y f − + − = − ; ;
* *       (3) 
The densities without asterisk represent the actual levels of the financial instrument in 
question across their distribution among owners. The starred density is our generated 
counterfactual.
15  
In order to interpret this decomposition, we can think of starting with the 
distribution of holdings in a particular country or region i and comparing it to what would 
have been observed if the population of holders were confronted with the same economic 
environment facing holders in the base country. The resulting difference (shown in the 
second bracket) represents these coefficient effects. We then compare the counterfactual 
to the actual density in the base country. This difference (shown in the first bracket) 
represents covariate effects, i.e. those attributable to differences in configuration of 
characteristics between owners in country or region i and those in the ‘base’ one. 21 
 
We also compute and present confidence bands for covariate and coefficient effects 
based on bootstrapped standard errors. These are calculated by first generating one 
hundred bootstrapped samples from the original sample of owners. Then, by repeating the 
process described above one hundred times, we generate a series of one hundred 
bootstrapped counterfactual distributions and use them to estimate standard errors.  
We have performed several robustness checks, which have yielded results very 
similar to those presented here (details can be found in the Web Appendix). An issue of 
potential concern is selectivity and its possible effects on the estimates of the covariate 
and coefficient effects. Given the lack of a generally accepted method of handling 
selectivity in quantile regression, we examined whether decompositions of mean 
differences in amounts are sensitive to selectivity. Specifically, we applied the selectivity-
corrected decompositions proposed by Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) and found that they 
give quite similar results to decompositions of mean differences that ignore selectivity 
(see Web Appendix, section IV for a fuller discussion). Thus, we doubt that our main 
conclusions about holdings are affected by this issue. 
 
4.2  Europe versus the US 
Table 6a shows coefficient and covariate effects for stockholding, private 
businesses, primary residence, and mortgage levels in older age. For brevity, we present 
results for the three quartiles only. In the Web Appendix, we present graphs depicting the 
entire distribution of holdings for each country/ financial instrument combination 
examined. 
Before going into details for each financial instrument, two important general 22 
 
observations can be made. First, we find effects of the economic environment that are 
typically large (in absolute value) and almost always statistically significant. Our 
estimation also picks up a number of instances with statistically significant effects of 
characteristics of the owner pools, but estimates are typically smaller and, in several 
instances, statistically insignificant.  
Second, unlike covariate effects, those of the economic environment are always of 
the same sign as overall observed differences in holding levels, sharing a common 
pattern. Indeed, in some cases (such as that of the primary residence), effects of owner 
characteristics point in the opposite direction of overall observed differences, but 
estimated effects of the economic environment are sufficiently large to overwhelm this 
opposite influence of characteristics, often by a large margin. It is in this sense that 
conditions of the economic environment are estimated to set the pattern of overall 
international differences in levels of holdings. 
 
4.2.1  Stockholding 
The first panel of Table 6a shows results for stock amounts, directly and indirectly 
held. US stockholders hold greater amounts of stock wealth across the distribution of 
stock holdings compared to any European country (except for Switzerland that exhibits 
larger holdings; and for Denmark, where holdings are similar). With the exception of 
Sweden (and possibly Spain), this difference is fundamentally attributable to effects of 
differences in the economic environment across all quantiles, with covariate effects close 
to zero. This means that, despite typically lower European stock holdings, European 
stockholders would achieve considerably higher levels if they were confronted with the 
US economic environment. Sweden also exhibits significant coefficient effects in this 23 
 
direction, but a large part of its observed difference in amounts invested in stocks relative 
to the US is attributable to the characteristics of its stockholder pool. This is an important 
consequence of the fact that stock market participation is more widespread in Sweden 
than in the US, and thus the composition of the Swedish stockholder pool is more diluted 
by households whose characteristics are less conducive to stockholding compared to their 
US counterparts. Our findings for the dominant role of coefficient effects seem quite 
consistent with equity market indicators compiled by the World Bank and other sources 
(Table A.1 in the Web Appendix). Austria, Greece, and Denmark exhibit the three lowest 
scores in terms of the World Bank stock market size indicator, which comprises market 
capitalization, value of stocks traded, and turnover ratios. At the other extreme, 
Switzerland ranks at the top of this index. Low stockholding levels are observed in 
countries exhibiting poor institutional characteristics, such as high transactions costs and 
limited shareholder rights, rather than being closely linked to properties of stock returns 
(as reflected in the volatility and market stability measures). 
Table 7, panel A summarizes results from a regression of coefficient effects 
estimated at different points of the asset amount distribution (i.e. indicative of the 
economic environment faced by both smaller and larger holders) on a set of country level 
indicators. Results suggest that shareholder rights and aggregate indicators of trust 
contribute to explaining the pattern of estimated coefficient effects across countries: 
higher ADRI and trust indicators in Europe tend to lead to narrowing of differences in 
economic environment that contribute to differences in stock holdings of small and 
medium investors. Relevant differences in economic environment can also be linked to 
the scale of stock markets (measured by the market capitalization to GDP ratio) and to the 24 
 
number of internet connections in the European country. Both reduce differences in 
stockholding amounts from the US at comparable points in the distributions of holdings. 
We also break up the sample of stockholders into those who are homeowners and 
those who are not (detailed results are presented in Table A.8 in the Web Appendix). 
Quite analogously to what we found for participation, differences between the US and 
European countries in amounts of stocks held tend to be larger when we focus on 
homeowners, and this applies also to coefficient effects. These findings are consistent 
with the view that Europeans regard investment in the home as a partial substitute for 
investment in stocks. Moreover, differences in the economic environment discourage 
European homeowners from larger exposures to the stock market more than they 
discourage US homeowners.  
 
4.2.2  Private Businesses 
The second panel of Table 6a shows observed differences and counterfactual 
decompositions for private business holdings among older owners. There is considerable 
variety in observed differences in holdings across the Atlantic. Swedish and Danish older 
owners of private businesses invest more than US owners across the entire distribution of 
holdings, but US holdings dominate those found in most other countries. Furthermore, 
there is not a clear pattern in the relationship between size of holdings and size of 
differences. There are cases, such as England or France, where differences are largest at 
the low end of holdings, vanishing at the upper end. There are other cases, where 
differences seem quite uniform over the distribution of amounts, such as Germany. 
Finally, in countries such as Spain, these differences increase with the size of holdings. 25 
 
Differences in economic environment tend to have statistically significant effects for 
smaller holders in the vast majority of countries, while statistical significance is 
attenuated for median and large holdings, with about half the countries exhibiting 
significant effects.  
The lack of definite pattern in Europe-US comparisons of private business holdings 
is consistent with the observation made in the section on participation that the top place 
of the US in the overall index of ease of doing business masks considerable diversity of 
rankings in the various components of the index.  
Results from robust regressions of coefficient effects on aggregate indicators (panel 
B, Table 7) suggest that a higher tax burden and difficulties in trading across borders in 
Europe are associated with larger differences in amounts invested in business compared 
to the US.   
 
4.2.3  Value of the Main Residence  
The third panel of Table 6a shows differences between the US and European 
countries in real gross values of the primary residence. In eight of the twelve countries 
considered, European homeowners invest larger amounts in their primary residence than 
US homeowners at the same point in the home value distribution. In only three cases 
(Sweden, Greece, and Spain for higher quantiles) are amounts invested larger among US 
owners than among European owners. The picture is even more striking when we 
decompose differences into coefficient and covariate effects. In all cases, characteristics 
of US homeowners push in the direction of larger investments in the primary residence. 
However, in ten of the twelve cases, Europeans of given characteristics tend to invest 26 
 
larger real amounts in the primary residence than US households with similar 
characteristics. Of the remaining two cases (Sweden and Denmark), only Swedish 
households tend to invest strictly less in the home than US homeowners of similar 
characteristics.  
To be sure, larger real holdings do not represent, on average, larger homes in 
Europe than in the US. As is well known (and further documented in Table A.3 in the 
Web Appendix), there is a large leap in the average size of dwellings when crossing the 
Atlantic. Europeans simply tie up larger real amounts in their primary residence 
compared to US homeowners of similar characteristics and position in the distribution of 
home values. 
We view this as an intriguing finding unlikely to have a simple explanation, 
primarily because of how widespread the tendency is for Europeans to have larger 
amounts invested in the house. It seems unlikely that the difference is simply price-
related. While there are areas in the US where land is abundant and house prices 
relatively low, the data include also homeowners from the W and the NE, where land is 
highly priced. While there are countries in Europe affected by a shortage of land (such as 
the Netherlands), and a number of countries that have experienced strong booms in real 
housing prices (especially Spain, UK, the Netherlands and Italy), the finding applies also 
to Germany, which exhibits stagnant or even declining house prices.  
Another possibility would be a uniformly more favorable tax treatment of housing 
in Europe. However, according to various features of the taxation system for residential 
property (summarized in Table A.4 in the Web Appendix), there is not such a clear 
favorable treatment. One possible exception is non-taxable capital gains, but again this 27 
 
applies only to some European countries. Paying larger amounts for the house (given 
household resources) is also unlikely to be linked to greater availability of large 
mortgages in Europe: loan to value ratios in mortgage markets are generally lower - or at 
least no higher - in Europe compared to the US (characteristics of mortgage markets are 
summarized by Table A.5 in the Web Appendix). We return to mortgages below. Finally, 
the possibility that the European preference for greater housing investment is linked to 
motives to give bequests or housing gifts, which tend to be more widespread in Europe 
than in the US, is weakened by the fact that we are already controlling for survey 
responses indicating the probability to leave a bequest. Greater prevalence of such factors 
would thus be captured in the configuration of covariates, which has been taken into 
account when deriving coefficient effects  
Table 7, panel C, summarizes results from regression analysis that associates 
coefficient effects in the housing market with a harmonized housing price index, and with 
the VAT on new homes. These suggest that increases in house prices or in VAT in 
European countries are likely to be associated with relatively smaller home investments 
by households therein, thus decreasing the distance from similar US households. 
 
4.2.4  Value of Mortgages for Main Residence 
Is the European tendency to invest more in the home mirrored by a tendency to 
hold larger mortgages in older age? The fourth panel of Table 6a compares mortgage 
holders in Europe and in the US and suggests that the answer to this question is negative, 
with Switzerland being the only exception.  28 
 
Going one step beyond observed differences, we see that mortgage owner 
characteristics contribute very little to the larger outstanding mortgages of US mortgage 
owners. The bulk of the difference is linked to the market conditions faced by holders of 
given characteristics. Mortgage holders in the US end up holding significantly larger 
mortgages to older age compared to European households with a similar configuration of 
characteristics. As these are equilibrium amounts, they partly reflect a tendency of the US 
financial sector to allow larger mortgages for owners of similar characteristics.  
These larger mortgages may in turn reflect longer durations of mortgages in the US 
(e.g. 30 versus 15 or 20 years), larger initial loan-to-value ratios, or more pronounced 
tendencies to move to more expensive homes, taking mortgages to finance the upgrade. 
Regardless of the precise mechanism, our findings suggest that US households were more 
exposed to the risk of negative home equity in 2004/5, i.e. shortly before the current 
financial crisis, than their European counterparts, as they tended to have both smaller 
home values and larger outstanding mortgages for given household characteristics.  
 
4.2.5  Do Differences Simply Reflect Pension Wealth? 
As our samples consist of households aged 50 and above, one may suspect that the 
international differences in asset holdings we found simply reflect differences in pension 
wealth levels. For example, larger investments in stocks or in homes in one country 
relative to another may be reflecting generally lower levels of pension wealth in that 
country. To examine this possibility we calculate two measures of pension wealth that we 
add to our net wealth measures and redo the main asset decompositions (details on the 
calculation of the pension wealth measures are provided in the Data Appendix). We 29 
 
derive qualitatively similar results to those we present suggesting a strong role for the 
economic environment even when household heterogeneity with respect to pension 
wealth is taken into account (results are discussed in section III of the Web Appendix and 
presented in Tables A.9-A.12).  
 
4.3  Similarity of Economic Conditions within the US and within Europe 
Table 6b shows decomposition of differences by quartile and by asset or debt,  both 
within the US and within Europe. A number of patterns emerge. First, observed 
differences in amounts held tend to be smaller and less likely to be significant within the 
US than across European countries. Second, coefficient effects are more likely to be 
significant when comparing real assets (homes and private businesses) than when 
comparing financial instruments (stocks and mortgages).  
This is consistent with intuition, as financial markets tend to be more integrated 
than housing or private business markets. Those having a primary residence in a 
particular region face the local housing market conditions. There are divergent indicators 
of housing market conditions within the US, such as lower prices and higher vacancy 
rates in the MW and in the S (the relevant data are provided in the Web Appendix). In 
order for these to be similar across regions, households need to be willing and able to 
move to where the housing market offers better terms. Even if the policy and institutional 
framework governing housing markets were fully harmonized across states or countries, 
differences could still arise because of differential employment opportunities or quality of 
factors complementary to housing (e.g. school quality). It is also expected that market 
conditions governing private business holdings turn out to be less homogeneous than 30 
 
those for stockholding and more homogeneous than housing. This market is less 
segmented than the housing market, because a household does not need to own a private 
business where its members want to live. However, supervision, control, and any 
participation in management of the business are considerably facilitated by geographical 
proximity. This results in some market segmentation, the effects of which show up in our 
findings. 
The US is a federal country with fiscal federalism and monetary policy run by the 
Fed. In Europe, monetary union encompasses most of the countries in our sample (except 
for Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, and England), while fiscal policies (determining, 
inter alia, the tax treatment of homes and of private businesses) are far less integrated. 
This asymmetry is currently being scrutinized, but fiscal union seems a remote prospect.  
Stocks are the asset for which coefficient effects were largely insignificant within 
the US, but this is not the case for Europe (panel A, Table 6b). The vast majority of 
countries exhibit strongly significant effects, both statistically and economically. Very 
few covariate effects turn out to be significant, practically all in favor of the German 
stockholder pool being conducive to larger holdings. Strong coefficient effects for 
financial assets suggest that European households neither invest in the same stock market 
nor do they consider the full spectrum of European markets as equally accessible to them, 
even after the adoption of the euro. This finding  is noteworthy, as it does not seem to be 
confined to small holders: coefficient effects tend to persist at the upper end of the 
distribution. 
For private businesses, we find statistically significant coefficient effects across 
Europe at various parts of the distribution (panel B, Table 6b). Coefficient effects for 31 
 
home values are statistically significant across the whole distribution (panel C, Table 6b). 
However, their estimated size and sign exhibit much greater variation across European 
countries. This is so, even though Germany has the lowest homeownership rate in the 
group and one might a priori assume that it offers uniformly less favorable conditions to 
homeowners. Analysis of mortgage levels in older age suggests that Germany does not 
offer the worst prospects for large mortgages in older age compared to several countries 
in Europe, despite its very low homeownership rate (panel D, Table 6b). This reinforces 
the points made in the participation section above, pointing to the observation that 
Germany did not have the lowest prevalence of mortgages among the European countries, 
nor the worst conditions for households of given characteristics to obtain a mortgage.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have used internationally comparable micro-survey data across 
thirteen countries to document and study sources of differences in portfolios of older 
households across the Atlantic, within the US, and within Europe. We focused our 
attention on the question of whether households possessing similar configuration of 
characteristics tend to form similar portfolios across these countries or regions. We 
applied modern techniques of counterfactual analysis to examine the role of differences 
in the economic environment governing household ownership of, and investment in, 
stocks, private businesses, and homes, as well as outstanding mortgages, controlling for a 
range of observable household characteristics.  
We show that households of comparable characteristics tend to have quite different 
probabilities of participating in a given asset, and also quite different PPP-adjusted 32 
 
holdings, both across the Atlantic and within Europe. In most cases, participation 
probabilities are greater in the US than in Europe. However, the same is not true for the 
levels of asset holdings. European asset owners tend to invest smaller real amounts in 
stocks and larger amounts in the primary residence than US households at comparable 
positions of the distribution of holdings, even after controlling for any differences in the 
configurations of characteristics in the owner pools. We also document that older US 
households had substantially higher mortgages relative to their European counterparts, 
even after controlling for observable household characteristics, and this took place shortly 
prior to the current financial crisis that created negative equity for many homeowners.  
By probing further into the stockholding decisions of home owners and non 
homeowners, we obtain results consistent with the view that Europeans tend to substitute 
investment in their primary residence for investment in stocks. This substitution arises, at 
least in part, from differences in the economic environment that seem to discourage 
European homeowners from a larger exposure to the stock market in comparison to their 
US counterparts. 
Our findings suggest that international differences in the configuration of owner 
pools play minimal or no role in generating observed differences in levels of asset and 
mortgage holdings, often pointing in the opposite direction of observed differences. 
Differences in conditions of the economic environment not only dictate observed 
differences but are also substantially more pronounced among European countries than 
among US regions, suggesting considerable potential for further integration and 
harmonization of economic environments within which households operate. 33 
 
Nevertheless, our analysis is positive rather than normative. Finding differences in 
economic environment does not necessarily imply that they should be eliminated through 
institutional reform and policy harmonization. Promoting holdings of particular assets or 
debts can be a political choice. Our findings provide a check on consistency between 
stated objectives and observed outcomes and point to statistically and economically 
significant differences in market conditions, both across the Atlantic and within Europe, 
much more so than within the US.  
Our study could encourage work in various directions. The pattern of coefficient 
effects between Europe and the US, signaling reversals between financial and real assets, 
as well as the pattern for smaller country groups present compelling challenges for future 
research aimed at further identifying their sources, likely persistence, and amenability to 
policy interventions. Our approach could be applied to analyzing market conditions for 
other assets or debts; other country groupings (for example, comparable surveys are 
currently being designed or taking place in Japan, Korea, China, and India); and 
demographic groups of interest, both within a given country and across countries. Finally, 
it could be applied to studies of the evolution and convergence of market conditions 
through time. 
Ultimately, recently available data and modern counterfactual methods of analysis 
can contribute to our understanding of the extent to which ‘single market programs’ 
aimed at the creation of areas without internal frontiers and with free movement of goods, 
persons, services, and capital have succeeded in transforming national residents into 
citizens of a global – or at least international – ‘village’, facing similar economic 
environments, policies and constraints regardless of the country in which they reside.  34 
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Stocks: all forms of direct and indirect holdings, except for occupational defined-
contribution pension plans (for which respondents are not asked directly in our sources).  
Private business: value of business net of any related debts.  
Principal residence: current value of the house that respondents own and in which they 
live.  
Mortgage debt: outstanding amount of all mortgages and any other loans on the primary 
residence. 
Net worth: the current value of all real and financial assets of the household minus the 
outstanding amounts of mortgage loans and all other debts.  
Household income: total household income from all sources net of capital income. 
Age: average age of the two partners in the couple or the age of the household heads if 
they don’t have a partner, 
Household size: number of all persons in the household. 
Work status: Retired [=1 if both partners in a couple are retired]; Working [=1 if any of 
the two partners is currently working]; Unemployed-other inactive (omitted category). 
Definitions are analogous for single heads. 
Marital status: Couple [=1 if respondents and their partners live together/ married]; 
Widow [=1 if the partner has died]; Never married [=1 if respondent has never married]; 
divorced (omitted category). 
Education: High school education [=1 if the highest educational certificate of any of the 
two partners is a high school degree, and none of the two has attended any post-
secondary educational institution]; Post-secondary education [=1 if any of the two 
partners has had at least some post-secondary education]; Less than high school 
education (omitted category). Definitions are analogous for single heads. 
Recall score: respondents are read ten words and are then immediately asked to repeat 
them, with the score in the recall test being equal to the number of correctly remembered 
words. For couples, the value of the variable is equal to the maximum score of the two 
partners, while for single heads it is equal to the individual score. 38 
 
Expectation to leave a bequest: reported probability of leaving a bequest (highest 
reported probability of the two partners). For single heads, it is equal to their reported 
probability. 
Self-reported Health Fair or Bad: =1 if any of the two partners (or the single head) 
report ‘fair’ or ‘poor’ health; ‘good’, ‘very good’ or ‘excellent’ health form the omitted 
category.  
Number of ADL’s: number of daily activities that the two partners (or the single head) 
face difficulties with. 
Provides Help to Others: = 1 if any of the two partners (or the single head) provides 
help to friends, relatives or neighbors in the month prior to the interview. 
Engages in Voluntary Activities: =1 if any of the two partners (or the single head) has 
done any voluntary or charity work in the month prior to the interview. 
Pension Wealth: we consider persons having any sort of public pensions and persons 
with no public pensions that are older than 65 (on the assumption that if they have not 
received any pension by that age, they are unlikely to receive it in the future). We then 
take the annual sum of all the included pension items (adjusted for PPP), increase it by a 
fixed percentage per year (in real terms) for all the years the person is expected to live 
(we get this information, by age and gender, from the lifetables for each country), we 
discount each future amount back to the present at a real rate of interest equal to three 
percent per year, and then sum all the discounted future pension amounts. We consider 
two cases for the fixed yearly real increase of the pension items: the first case entails no 
increase, and the second entails a one percent increase. For the US we consider only the 
first case, as public pensions therein are fixed in real terms.  
The pension items included are: i) for the HRS the Social Security pension and 
any disability pension; ii) for ELSA, the main pension, the incapacity benefit,  the war 
pension, the severe dismemberment allowance, and the disability living allowance; iii) for 
SHARE, the main pension, any other public early retirement pension, a widow’s pension, 
the war pension, and the disability pension.   39
 
 
Table 1: Ownership rates and amounts by quartiles 
 
25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75 25 50 75
United States 13,073 40.0 162.1 437.0 49.7 11.0 49.5 169.0 9.8 40.0 100.0 350.0 77.3 80.0 150.0 250.0 38.3 32.0 70.0 125.0
Midwest 3,170 52.0 178.2 428.1 54.5 10.0 45.0 150.2 13.8 50.0 150.0 400.0 80.9 82.0 132.0 200.0 39.3 30.0 65.0 105.0
Northeast 2,125 39.7 193.5 475.9 54.7 11.0 52.0 172.5 6.8 40.0 100.0 300.0 70.6 92.0 190.0 340.0 32.5 32.0 70.0 124.0
South 5,138 29.9 113.0 326.0 42.6 10.0 43.9 153.0 9.3 25.0 90.0 250.0 78.3 63.0 100.0 180.0 36.5 28.5 58.0 102.0
West 2,399 53.0 228.5 582.0 52.1 14.0 53.3 182.5 8.6 30.0 100.0 300.0 76.9 140.0 250.0 400.0 46.0 50.0 100.0 178.7
Europe 25,394 28.4 147.6 307.5 27.0 3.6 10.6 31.0 6.4 21.4 63.8 206.9 68.3 109.8 178.3 291.1 14.9 12.3 36.0 76.6
Sweden 2,140 22.5 90.6 219.7 70.8 4.0 12.1 33.3 12.9 72.6 343.1 939.3 68.9 51.2 92.1 153.5 40.2 15.2 30.7 57.0
Denmark 1,176 14.7 102.9 258.6 56.1 2.7 8.3 22.7 9.6 84.4 337.7 1,688.4 69.2 90.8 136.2 204.2 44.3 28.4 56.7 90.8
Germany 2,002 11.8 95.4 272.6 25.4 3.5 9.4 26.2 6.5 21.0 52.4 151.7 51.2 136.3 209.7 314.6 14.8 12.6 36.7 83.3
Netherlands 1,954 9.6 140.4 336.4 24.9 4.6 15.2 42.1 6.9 18.2 75.9 505.9 55.2 192.3 253.0 374.4 43.1 23.8 54.6 110.4
Belgium 2,532 96.6 199.4 370.0 37.7 5.1 20.4 69.6 5.5 63.7 128.5 308.3 80.0 127.4 173.6 254.8 11.9 5.2 14.4 32.7
France 2,110 49.4 177.1 348.9 43.0 2.7 8.5 26.6 6.0 9.8 61.7 208.8 72.2 124.1 186.2 310.4 11.9 7.9 23.7 51.7
Switzerland 712 35.5 198.4 419.3 36.3 7.2 25.5 89.3 10.9 54.6 117.1 351.9 54.8 229.5 317.4 459.1 45.3 51.0 104.6 201.3
Austria 1,409 9.4 112.5 244.5 10.2 3.0 8.1 27.4 4.1 45.9 81.0 216.0 56.7 108.0 162.0 270.0 9.2 1.9 10.8 43.2
Italy 1,778 46.4 149.5 297.2 10.4 4.7 14.1 36.1 6.5 15.4 58.3 120.0 75.1 95.4 168.7 281.2 5.6 9.6 27.0 56.2
Spain 1,753 73.2 140.7 254.1 12.8 3.9 11.0 24.7 6.7 30.2 57.7 117.1 86.9 84.1 131.3 219.7 9.7 9.5 30.2 58.6
Greece 1,982 55.8 111.7 215.6 10.6 1.1 4.7 12.4 6.6 37.2 93.1 437.7 84.3 62.0 95.5 148.9 5.5 5.0 18.6 37.2
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Note: Weighted statistics using 2004 HRS, SHARE and ELSA data. All amounts are in thousand of PPP-adjusted dollars. PPP exchange rates are taken from the 
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Table 2: Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables/Country USA Sweden Denmark Germany Netherlands Belgium France Switzerland Austria Italy Spain Greece England
Age 64.3 67.1 65.5 66.0 65.5 66.5 66.7 65.0 66.3 66.7 67.2 66.8 67.2
Household size 2.18 1.79 1.76 1.87 1.95 2.02 2.03 1.93 1.84 2.37 2.49 2.15 1.38
High School 
Education 0.57 0.27 0.40 0.55 0.25 0.27 0.31 0.44 0.48 0.22 0.09 0.24 0.22
College Education 0.28 0.26 0.40 0.30 0.25 0.31 0.23 0.12 0.27 0.08 0.14 0.16 0.15
Recall Score 5.90 4.20 4.48 3.98 4.07 3.69 3.41 4.58 3.81 2.93 2.70 3.56 5.92
Self Reported Health 
Fair or Bad 0.35 0.23 0.37 0.53 0.41 0.42 0.47 0.28 0.40 0.59 0.56 0.41 0.36
Number of ADL's 0.40 0.83 0.34 0.34 0.52 0.62 0.51 0.21 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.30 1.57
Retired 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.43 0.57 0.56 0.44 0.63 0.57 0.43 0.50 0.55
Working 0.51 0.47 0.44 0.37 0.40 0.31 0.35 0.50 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.34 0.34
Couple 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.60 0.63 0.67 0.62 0.65 0.53 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.55
Widow 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.28 0.26
Never Married 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.07
Expectation to Leave 
a Bequest 0.88 0.87 0.86 0.80 0.73 0.90 0.85 0.86 0.79 0.84 0.83 0.89 0.85
Provides Help to 
Others 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.45 0.55 0.62 0.59 0.51 0.48 0.59 0.30 0.36 0.18
Engages in 
Voluntary Activities 0.41 0.40 0.37 0.26 0.44 0.37 0.38 0.34 0.20 0.32 0.13 0.08 0.16
Household Income 28,502.0 31,617.6 30,511.7 27,020.2 29,989.7 19,732.1 25,862.9 29,379.6 27,469.2 19,197.1 14,228.5 13,698.4 17,451.1
Net Worth 162,100.0 90,586.1 102,913.7 95,418.1 140,448.9 199,399.8 177,104.7 198,392.6 112,521.6 149,455.6 140,690.8 111,671.4 257,350.7
 
Note: All amounts are in thousands of PPP-adjusted dollars. PPP exchange rates are taken from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2007).  For 
variable definitions, please see the Data Appendix. Averages are shown for age, household size, recall score, number of limitations in activities of daily living 
(ADLs), and expectation to leave a bequest, while medians for household income and net worth. The figures for the remaining variables denote prevalence, i.e. 





















Sweden -0.211 -0.346 *** 0.135 *** -0.031 -0.061 *** 0.030 *** 0.083 0.066 *** 0.018 *** -0.019 -0.082 *** 0.062 ***
Denmark -0.064 -0.132 *** 0.068 *** 0.003 -0.018 * 0.020 *** 0.080 0.072 *** 0.008 -0.060 -0.095 *** 0.035 ***
Germany 0.243 0.133 *** 0.110 *** 0.033 0.010 0.024 *** 0.260 0.195 *** 0.066 *** 0.234 0.146 *** 0.088 ***
Netherlands 0.248 0.112 *** 0.136 *** 0.029 0.008 0.021 *** 0.221 0.149 *** 0.071 *** -0.049 -0.112 *** 0.063 ***
Belgium 0.120 0.047 *** 0.073 *** 0.044 0.055 *** -0.011 ** -0.027 -0.038 *** 0.011 0.264 0.218 *** 0.046 ***
France 0.067 -0.041 *** 0.108 *** 0.038 0.025 *** 0.013 *** 0.051 0.003 0.048 *** 0.264 0.200 *** 0.063 ***
Switzerland 0.134 0.048 ** 0.086 *** -0.011 -0.014 0.003 0.225 0.230 *** -0.005 -0.070 -0.110 *** 0.040 ***
Austria 0.395 0.266 *** 0.128 *** 0.057 0.031 *** 0.026 *** 0.205 0.127 *** 0.078 *** 0.291 0.207 *** 0.084 ***
Italy 0.393 0.169 *** 0.223 *** 0.033 0.011 0.022 *** 0.022 -0.034 ** 0.056 *** 0.327 0.240 *** 0.088 ***
Spain 0.369 0.104 *** 0.264 *** 0.031 0.008 0.023 *** -0.096 -0.183 *** 0.087 *** 0.286 0.221 *** 0.065 ***
Greece 0.391 0.178 *** 0.213 *** 0.032 0.015 * 0.017 *** -0.070 -0.094 *** 0.024 *** 0.328 0.257 *** 0.071 ***
England 0.103 0.027 ** 0.076 *** 0.073 0.072 *** 0.002 0.012 -0.042 *** 0.054 *** 0.215 0.150 *** 0.064 ***
Country/  
Region



























Note: All amounts are in thousands of PPP-adjusted dollars. PPP exchange rates are taken from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2007).  For 
variable definitions, please see the Data Appendix. All decompositions differences calculated with respect to the US. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%, respectively. Standard errors have been computed using 200 bootstrap replications. 
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US Northeast -0.002 -0.023 *** 0.021 *** 0.070 0.057 *** 0.014 *** 0.102 0.063 *** 0.039 *** 0.069 0.054 * 0.014 *
US South 0.119 0.040 *** 0.079 *** 0.045 0.023 *** 0.023 *** 0.025 -0.030 *** 0.055 *** 0.028 0.019 0.009
US West 0.025 0.045 *** -0.020 *** 0.053 0.052 0.001 0.041 0.023 *** 0.018 *** -0.065 -0.053 -0.012
Sweden -0.454 -0.454 *** 0.000 -0.064 -0.077 *** 0.012 ** -0.177 -0.173 *** -0.004 -0.254 -0.216 *** -0.038 **
Denmark -0.307 -0.271 *** -0.035 *** -0.031 -0.028 ** -0.003 -0.180 -0.136 *** -0.044 *** -0.294 -0.257 *** -0.038 ***
Netherlands 0.005 0.019 -0.014 -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 -0.040 -0.092 *** 0.052 *** -0.283 -0.241 *** -0.042 ***
Belgium -0.122 -0.080 *** -0.042 *** 0.010 0.018 * -0.007 -0.288 -0.263 *** -0.025 0.029 0.080 *** -0.050 ***
France -0.176 -0.160 *** -0.015 0.005 0.005 -0.001 -0.210 -0.221 *** 0.011 0.029 0.073 *** -0.044 ***
Switzerland -0.109 -0.067 ** -0.043 ** -0.045 -0.037 ** -0.008 -0.036 -0.009 -0.026 -0.304 -0.266 *** -0.039 **
Austria 0.152 0.146 *** 0.006 0.023 0.026 *** -0.003 -0.055 -0.101 *** 0.046 *** 0.057 0.064 *** -0.007
Italy 0.150 0.115 *** 0.035 -0.001 -0.019 0.019 ** -0.239 -0.279 *** 0.040 0.093 0.123 *** -0.030
Spain 0.126 0.080 *** 0.046 * -0.003 -0.026 ** 0.023 ** -0.357 -0.422 *** 0.066 ** 0.051 0.071 ** -0.020
Greece 0.149 0.124 *** 0.025 -0.002 -0.016 0.014 * -0.331 -0.363 *** 0.032 0.093 0.096 *** -0.003































Note: All amounts are in thousands of PPP-adjusted dollars. PPP exchange rates are taken from the Penn World Tables, version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2007).  For 
variable definitions, please see the Data Appendix. All decompositions differences calculated with respect to the US. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% 
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Table 4: Selected Aggregate Indicators 
 









































Austria  29.6 4  486  70.2  30 19  102  13  119.5  10-20 
Belgium  219.6 2  458  63.0  20 41  62  38  120.8  21 
Denmark  62.3 4  527 131.9  7 19  19  3  129.2 25 
France  92.7 5  430  37.9  47 96  92  81  113.0 19.6 
Germany  44.0 4  455  75.8  21 3  70  6  117.3 16 
Greece  61.6 3  180  54.6  111 76  100  119  132.2 11-13 
Italy  47.2 4  478  60.8  69 41  112  103 125.1  4 
Netherlands  107.8 4  739  90.6  22 13  81  16  139.9  19 
Spain  94.9 6  348  40.9  38 19  103  24  125.2  7 
Sweden  108.8 4  764  134.5  14 33  37 9  126.4  25 
Switzerland  229.7 3  498  107.4  16 19 7 47  n.a  n.a. 
UK  131.5 5  473  61.7  5 1  11  14 118.2 0 
USA  139.9 2  630  78.8  3 7  55  10  n.a  0 
 
Note: Stockholding: Market Cap to GDP Ratio (%):  the ratio of market capitalization to GDP (Source: World Development Indicators). Antidirector rights index: 
revised version for 2005 by Spamann (2009) of the originally computed index by La Porta et al. (1998) that aggregates the shareholder rights (more details are 
provided in Table A1 of the Web Appendix). The country index of interpersonal trust is from the ASEP/ JDS Databank. Business: World Bank, Doing Business 
(http://www.doingbusiness.org), rankings for 2005. The ease of doing business index is calculated as the ranking on the simple average of country percentile 
rankings on each of the 10 topics covered in Doing Business (more details are provided in Table A2 of the Web Appendix). The ranking on each topic is the 
simple average of the percentile rankings on its component indicators. Getting credit: Strength of legal rights index, depth of credit information index. Paying 
taxes: Number of tax payments, time to prepare tax returns and total taxes as a share of commercial profits. Trading across borders: Documents, time and cost to 
export and import. House: Indicators are from Housing Statistics in the European Union for 2004 (National Board of Housing, Building and Planning, Sweden). 










Note: Robust regression estimates of estimated differences in ownership rates due to 
coefficients on various indicators. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Tax burden/ difficulty in getting credit/ difficulty in trading 
 
Indicator Coefficient Std. Error
Market capitalization to GDP ratio -0.0008 0.0007
Internet Connections 0.0000 0.0004
Antidirector Rights Index -0.0566 0.0251 **
Country Index of Interpersonal Trust -0.0035 0.0020 *
R2 0.55
Tax Burden 0.0003 0.0001 ***
Difficulty in Getting Credit 0.0003 0.0001 **
Difficulty in Trading Across Borders -0.0002 0.0001
R2 0.53
Housing Price Index (harmonized) -0.0004 0.0051
VAT on New Homes 0.0065 0.0027 **
R2 0.26
Panel C. Home
Differences due to Coefficients
Panel A. Stocks
Panel B. Own Business  45
 







Sweden 1.024 0.185 *** 0.839 *** 1.407 0.428 *** 0.979 *** 1.625 0.748 *** 0.877 ***
Denmark 1.407 0.974 *** 0.432 *** 1.788 1.233 *** 0.555 *** 2.008 1.528 *** 0.480 ***
Germany 1.138 0.982 *** 0.156 ** 1.657 1.339 *** 0.318 *** 1.864 1.570 *** 0.294 ***
Netherlands 0.882 0.681 *** 0.201 *** 1.182 0.896 *** 0.286 *** 1.391 1.143 *** 0.248 ***
Belgium 0.761 0.671 *** 0.090 0.887 0.659 *** 0.228 *** 0.887 0.677 *** 0.210 ***
France 1.406 1.090 *** 0.316 *** 1.758 1.297 *** 0.460 *** 1.848 1.439 *** 0.409 ***
Switzerland 0.421 0.148 0.273 *** 0.663 0.238 ** 0.425 *** 0.638 0.240 0.398 ***
Austria 1.293 1.508 *** -0.215 *** 1.810 1.846 *** -0.036 1.818 1.801 *** 0.016
Italy 0.845 0.574 *** 0.271 *** 1.253 0.800 *** 0.453 *** 1.543 1.132 *** 0.411 ***
Spain 1.026 0.504 *** 0.523 *** 1.506 0.890 *** 0.616 *** 1.923 1.411 *** 0.511 ***
Greece 2.288 1.935 *** 0.353 *** 2.365 1.891 *** 0.474 *** 2.612 2.229 *** 0.383 ***
England 0.873 0.851 *** 0.022 1.153 1.025 *** 0.128 *** 1.177 1.082 *** 0.096 **
Sweden -0.596 -0.877 *** 0.281 -1.233 -1.445 *** 0.212 ** -0.987 -1.428 *** 0.441 ***
Denmark -0.747 -1.084 *** 0.337 * -1.217 -1.370 *** 0.153 -1.574 -1.877 *** 0.303 ***
Germany 0.646 0.371 0.275 0.646 0.501 *** 0.145 0.836 0.489 *** 0.347 ***
Netherlands 0.787 0.620 *** 0.167 0.276 0.308 -0.032 -0.369 -0.623 0.254 **
Belgium -0.465 -0.341 *** -0.124 -0.251 -0.048 -0.203 ** 0.127 0.040 0.087
France 1.405 1.280 *** 0.125 0.484 0.458 0.025 0.517 0.231 0.285 **
Switzerland -0.312 -0.336 ** 0.024 -0.158 -0.118 -0.039 -0.006 -0.126 0.121
Austria -0.138 -0.531 0.394 ** 0.211 -0.071 0.281 *** 0.483 -0.062 0.545 ***
Italy 0.956 0.866 *** 0.089 0.540 0.448 *** 0.092 1.070 0.640 *** 0.431 ***
Spain 0.281 0.094 0.187 0.551 0.397 *** 0.154 1.095 0.658 *** 0.437 ***
Greece 0.072 -0.548 *** 0.620 *** 0.072 -0.389 * 0.461 *** -0.224 -0.971 *** 0.747 ***
England 1.876 2.154 *** -0.278 0.960 1.433 *** -0.474 *** 0.267 0.591 * -0.324 ***
Sweden 0.447 0.178 *** 0.269 *** 0.488 0.162 *** 0.326 *** 0.488 0.227 *** 0.261 ***
Denmark -0.126 -0.264 *** 0.138 *** 0.097 -0.085 ** 0.182 *** 0.202 0.089 * 0.114 ***
Germany -0.533 -0.741 *** 0.208 *** -0.335 -0.603 *** 0.268 *** -0.230 -0.432 *** 0.202 ***
Netherlands -0.877 -1.084 *** 0.207 *** -0.523 -0.776 *** 0.253 *** -0.404 -0.591 *** 0.187 ***
Belgium -0.465 -0.833 *** 0.368 *** -0.146 -0.538 *** 0.392 *** -0.019 -0.324 *** 0.305 ***
France -0.439 -0.827 *** 0.388 *** -0.216 -0.642 *** 0.426 *** -0.216 -0.567 *** 0.351 ***
Switzerland -1.054 -1.196 *** 0.142 *** -0.750 -0.943 *** 0.193 *** -0.608 -0.738 *** 0.130 ***
Austria -0.300 -0.651 *** 0.351 *** -0.077 -0.470 *** 0.393 *** -0.077 -0.417 *** 0.340 ***
Italy -0.176 -0.834 *** 0.657 *** -0.118 -0.799 *** 0.681 *** -0.118 -0.713 *** 0.596 ***
Spain -0.050 -0.815 *** 0.766 *** 0.133 -0.605 *** 0.739 *** 0.129 -0.476 *** 0.605 ***
Greece 0.254 -0.345 *** 0.599 *** 0.451 -0.141 *** 0.592 *** 0.518 0.048 ** 0.470 ***
England -0.873 -1.260 *** 0.387 *** -0.609 -1.044 *** 0.436 *** -0.466 -0.825 *** 0.360 ***
Sweden 0.746 0.440 *** 0.306 *** 0.824 0.519 *** 0.306 *** 0.785 0.495 *** 0.291 ***
Denmark 0.121 -0.049 0.170 *** 0.210 0.027 0.183 *** 0.320 0.140 *** 0.180 ***
Germany 0.933 0.918 *** 0.016 0.646 0.569 *** 0.077 *** 0.406 0.312 *** 0.094 ***
Netherlands 0.296 0.351 *** -0.055 0.248 0.253 *** -0.006 0.124 0.119 *** 0.004
Belgium 1.821 1.874 *** -0.053 1.580 1.564 *** 0.015 1.342 1.290 *** 0.053 *
France 1.404 1.303 *** 0.101 ** 1.085 0.933 *** 0.152 *** 0.882 0.696 *** 0.186 ***
Switzerland -0.466 -0.427 *** -0.040 -0.401 -0.381 *** -0.020 -0.477 -0.456 *** -0.020
Austria 2.812 2.777 *** 0.035 1.869 1.778 *** 0.091 *** 1.063 0.933 *** 0.130 ***
Italy 1.208 0.981 *** 0.228 *** 0.953 0.718 *** 0.235 *** 0.799 0.580 *** 0.219 ***
Spain 1.213 0.916 *** 0.297 *** 0.842 0.593 *** 0.249 *** 0.758 0.530 *** 0.228 ***
Greece 1.864 1.716 *** 0.148 *** 1.325 1.136 *** 0.189 *** 1.211 0.997 *** 0.215 ***
























25th Quantile 50th Quantile 75th Quantile
 
 
Note: All amounts: thousands of PPP-adjusted dollars. For variable definitions, see Data Appendix. All differences calculated relative 
to the US. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors computed using 100 bootstrap replications.   46








US Northeast -0.095 0.048 -0.143 * -0.145 -0.022 -0.122 * -0.139 0.039 -0.178 *
US South 0.000 0.082 -0.082 0.025 0.052 -0.027 -0.019 0.095 -0.114
US West -0.337 0.038 -0.375 *** -0.168 0.186 *** -0.354 *** -0.195 0.184 ** -0.379 ***
Sweden -0.114 -0.719 *** 0.604 *** -0.251 -0.791 *** 0.540 *** -0.239 -0.810 *** 0.572 ***
Denmark 0.269 0.035 0.233 ** 0.131 -0.048 0.178 * 0.144 -0.032 0.176 *
Netherlands -0.256 -0.430 *** 0.174 * -0.475 -0.493 *** 0.018 -0.473 -0.522 *** 0.049
Belgium -0.377 -0.442 *** 0.066 -0.770 -0.745 *** -0.025 -0.976 -1.006 *** 0.030
France 0.268 0.006 0.262 *** 0.100 -0.137 ** 0.238 ** -0.016 -0.285 *** 0.269 ***
Switzerland -0.717 -0.766 *** 0.049 -0.994 -1.025 *** 0.031 -1.225 -1.376 *** 0.151
Austria 0.155 0.329 -0.174 * 0.153 0.383 -0.230 ** -0.046 0.104 -0.150
Italy -0.293 -0.517 *** 0.225 ** -0.404 -0.580 *** 0.175 * -0.320 -0.559 *** 0.239 ***
Spain -0.112 -0.429 *** 0.317 *** -0.152 -0.359 *** 0.207 ** 0.059 -0.212 * 0.271 ***
Greece 1.150 1.020 *** 0.129 0.707 0.614 *** 0.094 0.748 0.580 *** 0.168 *
England -0.265 -0.302 *** 0.037 -0.504 -0.339 *** -0.165 * -0.687 -0.564 *** -0.123
US Northeast 0.223 0.309 -0.086 0.406 0.460 *** -0.054 0.288 0.341 -0.053
US South 0.693 0.798 *** -0.105 0.511 0.514 *** -0.003 0.470 0.420 *** 0.050
US West 0.511 0.653 ** -0.142 0.406 0.461 ** -0.056 0.288 0.325 -0.037
Sweden -1.242 -1.067 *** -0.174 -1.879 -1.669 *** -0.210 * -1.823 -1.705 *** -0.118
Denmark -1.393 -1.416 *** 0.023 -1.863 -1.731 *** -0.132 -2.410 -2.417 *** 0.007
Netherlands 0.141 0.109 0.032 -0.370 -0.261 -0.109 -1.205 -1.098 ** -0.107
Belgium -1.111 -1.016 *** -0.095 -0.896 -0.737 *** -0.159 -0.709 -0.609 *** -0.101
France 0.759 0.572 * 0.188 -0.162 -0.181 0.019 -0.319 -0.417 ** 0.097
Switzerland -0.957 -1.100 *** 0.142 -0.803 -0.737 *** -0.066 -0.842 -0.845 ** 0.003
Austria -0.783 -0.768 ** -0.016 -0.435 -0.177 -0.258 ** -0.353 -0.092 -0.261
Italy 0.310 0.305 0.005 -0.106 -0.085 -0.021 0.234 0.229 0.005
Spain -0.365 -0.591 *** 0.226 -0.095 -0.310 *** 0.215 * 0.259 -0.195 0.453 **
Greece -0.574 -0.764 *** 0.190 -0.574 -0.739 *** 0.165 -1.060 -1.427 *** 0.367 **
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US Northeast -0.115 -0.114 *** -0.001 -0.364 -0.346 *** -0.019 -0.531 -0.479 *** -0.052 **
US South 0.264 0.134 *** 0.129 *** 0.278 0.194 *** 0.084 *** 0.105 0.077 *** 0.029
US West -0.535 -0.532 *** -0.003 -0.639 -0.622 *** -0.016 -0.693 -0.651 *** -0.042 **
Sweden 0.980 0.938 *** 0.042 0.823 0.776 *** 0.047 0.718 0.701 *** 0.017
Denmark 0.407 0.372 *** 0.035 0.432 0.416 *** 0.016 0.432 0.413 *** 0.019
Netherlands -0.344 -0.378 *** 0.034 -0.188 -0.222 *** 0.035 -0.174 -0.199 *** 0.024
Belgium 0.068 -0.027 0.095 * 0.189 0.097 ** 0.092 *** 0.211 0.143 *** 0.067 *
France 0.094 -0.021 0.115 ** 0.119 0.007 0.112 *** 0.014 -0.081 *** 0.095 ***
Switzerland -0.521 -0.478 *** -0.043 -0.414 -0.408 *** -0.006 -0.378 -0.390 *** 0.012
Austria 0.233 0.085 *** 0.148 *** 0.258 0.147 *** 0.112 *** 0.153 0.059 *** 0.094 ***
Italy 0.357 0.159 * 0.198 *** 0.217 0.002 0.215 *** 0.112 -0.062 *** 0.174 ***
Spain 0.483 0.242 *** 0.241 *** 0.469 0.231 *** 0.237 *** 0.359 0.167 *** 0.192 ***
Greece 0.787 0.592 *** 0.196 *** 0.786 0.588 *** 0.198 *** 0.748 0.600 *** 0.148 ***
England -0.340 -0.410 *** 0.070 -0.274 -0.360 *** 0.086 *** -0.236 -0.276 *** 0.040
US Northeast -0.065 -0.025 -0.040 -0.074 -0.022 -0.052 -0.166 0.002 -0.168 ***
US South 0.051 -0.039 0.090 * 0.114 0.028 0.086 0.029 0.029 0.000
US West -0.511 -0.431 *** -0.080 -0.431 -0.337 *** -0.094 * -0.532 -0.339 *** -0.193 ***
Sweden -0.188 -0.493 *** 0.305 * 0.179 -0.206 *** 0.384 *** 0.380 -0.033 0.413 ***
Denmark -0.813 -0.892 *** 0.079 -0.436 -0.639 *** 0.203 ** -0.086 -0.286 *** 0.200 **
Netherlands -0.638 -0.608 *** -0.029 -0.398 -0.504 *** 0.106 -0.282 -0.368 *** 0.086
Belgium 0.888 0.851 *** 0.037 0.934 0.920 *** 0.014 0.937 0.947 *** -0.010
France 0.470 0.417 *** 0.053 0.439 0.341 ** 0.098 0.477 0.388 *** 0.089
Switzerland -1.400 -1.195 *** -0.205 -1.047 -1.106 *** 0.059 -0.882 -0.999 *** 0.117
Austria 1.879 1.899 *** -0.020 1.223 1.177 *** 0.046 0.657 0.698 ** -0.041
Italy 0.275 0.150 0.125 0.307 0.169 0.138 0.393 0.163 0.231 **
Spain 0.279 0.095 0.184 0.196 -0.054 0.250 ** 0.353 0.117 0.235 **
Greece 0.930 0.990 *** -0.060 0.679 0.651 *** 0.028 0.806 0.708 *** 0.098

























Note: All amounts are in thousands of PPP-adjusted dollars. For variable definitions, please see the Data Appendix. All 
decompositions for US regions refer to differences with respect to the Midwest, while for European countries to differences with 
respect to Germany. Quantiles are computed among owners of each asset. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. Standard errors computed using 100 bootstrap replications. 
 
 
   48
 
Table 7: Coefficient Effects Related to Selected Economic Indicators (amounts) 
 
 
Note: Robust regression estimates of estimated differences in asset distribution due to coefficients on various indicators.  ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Indicator Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error CoefficientStd. Error
Market capitalization to GDP ratio -0.0052 0.0006 *** -0.0069 0.0015 *** -0.0072 0.0007 ***
Internet Connections -0.0010 0.0004 *** -0.0008 0.0005 -0.0014 0.0002 ***
Antidirector Rights Index -0.1375 0.0246 *** -0.1648 0.0763 ** 0.0002 0.0314
Country Index of Interpersonal Trust -0.0051 0.0014 *** -0.0043 0.0025 * 0.0001 0.0017
R2 0.94 0.87 0.96
Tax Burden 0.0097 0.0040 ** 0.0063 0.0062 0.0131 0.0049 ***
Difficulty in Getting Credit -0.0017 0.0200 -0.0505 0.0167 *** -0.0192 0.0130
Difficulty in Trading Across Borders -0.0004 0.0095 0.0212 0.0084 ** 0.0048 0.0079
R2 0.21 0.66 0.46
Housing Price Index (harmonized) 0.0379 0.0062 *** 0.0343 0.0052 *** 0.0093 0.0614
VAT on New Homes 0.0346 0.0098 *** 0.0295 0.0059 *** 0.0267 0.0166
R2 0.82 0.90 0.96
Panel C. Home
Differences due to Coefficients
10th percentile 50th percentile 90th percentile
Panel A. Stocks
Panel B. Own Business  49
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Theory and country-level data on the structure of household portfolios are presented in the contributions 
contained in Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2001); and in the review paper of Haliassos (2008). Retirement 
accounts were a major factor promoting stockholding participation in the US. Limited stockholding participation 
in the early to mid 1980s was documented in US data by King and Leape (1984), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), 
and Haliassos and Bertaut (1995). A number of authors have recently explored determinants of participation in 
stockholding. See, for example, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Cocco et al. (2005), Heaton and Lucas (2000a,b), 
Gollier (2001), Campbell and Viceira (2002), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), and Gomes and Michaelides 
(2005). Bilias et al. (2006, 2010) explore effects of increased participation on the distribution of wealth and stock 
trading patterns, respectively. Campbell (2006) discusses stockholding participation, as well as under-
diversification, and mortgage behavior of households, while reviewing the relevant literature. Campbell and 
Cocco (2003) study optimal mortgage choice, while Cocco (2005) studies effects of housing on the composition 
of the financial portfolio. 
2 Albrecht et al. (2003), using counterfactual decompositions, find evidence that the gender wage gap is 
increasing at higher percentiles of the wage distribution in Sweden. For a recent study on trends in US wage 
inequality in the last forty years see Autor et al. (2008). Recently, counterfactual techniques were used to 
examine international differences in gender wage gaps or labor status dynamics and relate them to country 
differences in population characteristics or in policies and institutions (see Arulampalam et al., 2007; and 
Kapteyn et al., 2007). 
3 For recent examples see Albrecht et al. (2003), Machado and Mata (2005), and Gale and Pence (2006). 
4 The SHARE data set and the sources of its funding are fully described in Börsch-Supan et al. (2005). The 
SHARE data collection has been primarily funded by the European Commission through the 5th framework 
program (project QLK6-CT-2001-00360 in the thematic program Quality of Life). Additional funding came 
from the US National Institute on Ageing (U01 AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, 
Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-064). Data collection in Austria (through the Austrian Science Foundation, 
FWF), Belgium (through the Belgian Science Policy Administration) and Switzerland (through 
BBW/OFES/UFES) was nationally funded. 
5 Details on asset definitions are provided in the Data Appendix. As will be discussed later, we examine the 
robustness of our findings by incorporating in net wealth an imputed measure of pension wealth. 
6 Work status is not included in regressions pertaining to private business ownership, in order to avoid potential 
endogeneity problems arising from the fact that owning a private business typically determines work status. 
7 Rosen and Wu (2004) provide evidence that households facing health problems are less likely to invest in 
stocks. 
8 For the effect of cognitive abilities (including recall) on stockholding see Christelis et al. (2006). 
9 Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) show that households who visit their neighbours more often have a higher 
propensity to invest in stocks, and they attribute this finding to the possibility that social interactions lower 
information costs. 
10 In Sweden, 2.5 percentage points of the 18.5 percentage points of lifetime income that are required as 
contribution to the public retirement scheme are saved and earn interest in a premium reserve account. Those 
insured can choose an investment manager for their premium reserve account, with the option to invest in stocks. 
In Denmark, The Special Pension (SP) is a mandatory individual retirement program (second pillar) with an 
annual contribution rate of 1% which was introduced in 1999. We are grateful to Julia LeBlanc for providing us 
with comparative information on pension systems. 
11 Spain and England are the exceptions in this list picked up by our estimates. 
12 See Bogan, 2008, for evidence on the link between stock market participation and Internet use. 
13 We tried a similar exercise by conditioning on ownership of private business instead of the home, but did not 
find a notable pattern of differences between owners and non-owners of businesses. While substitution between 
stocks and private businesses is not unlikely and has been noted in the literature for the US (e.g. Heaton and 
Lucas, 2000b), our failure to find a pattern may be due to the small number of private business owners in our 
sample.   50
                                                                                                                                                                         
14 See also Albrecht et al. (2003), who use a similar approach to study gender wage discrimination in Sweden. 
15 The thresholds for income and wealth quartiles are defined for the base country or region over all households 
in the sample. Households in the country or region that is compared to the base are then placed in quartiles 
according to those thresholds.    
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